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NOTES
"ARRANGER LIABILITY" UNDER THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND
LIABILITY ACT (CERCLA): JUDICIAL RETREAT FROM
LEGISLATIVE INTENT
Although it is easy to sympathize with the courts' intuitive
desire to hold liable parties whose egregious and tortious ac-
tions have posed environmental hazards for the rest of soci-
ety, we must also recognize the constraints of the statute that
Congress has enacted. CERCLA imposes strict liability; con-
siderations of fault or blameworthiness are, by definition,
irrelevant under its terms.1
In enacting the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Lability Act of 19802 (CERCLA), Congress
intended to hold liable, among others, responsible parties that
"arranged for" the disposal of hazardous materials. The statute's
failure to explicitly define "arranged for," combined with its
scant legislative history, has led to multiple interpretations of
CERCLA arranger liability by the federal courts of appeals,
ranging from a standard of strict liability to a standard requir-
ing specific intent. The lack of a unified judicial approach places
individuals and corporations affected by the statute in the pre-
carious position of being uncertain of their potential liability as
"arrangers" under CERCLA. The confusion is unnecessary, how-
ever, because the existing statutory language and the available
legislative history are sufficient to discern the meaning of "ar-
ranged for" intended by Congress and required of the courts
when interpreting CERCLA.
1. Lynda J. Oswald, Strict Liability of Individuals Under CERCLA: A Normative
Analysis, 20 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 579, 635 (1993).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994).
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During the first decade following CERCLA's enactment, courts
consistently applied a strict liability standard to those who "ar-
ranged for" the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances,
relying primarily on the statutory wording of CERCLA and its
available legislative history. In 1993, however, when writing for
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
Judge Richard Posner opted instead to adopt an approach re-
quiring specific intent,3 ignoring over a decade of existing
CERCLA case law. Unfortunately, the effect of Judge Posner's
decision extended well beyond the facts of that individual case;
in essence, the opinion served as an indication to other courts
that CERCLA arranger liability was subject to varying interpre-
tations, setting the stage for judicial activism.
Following Posner's decision, federal courts located in
jurisdictions that previously had not ruled on the issue of
CERCLA arranger liability discovered two disparate approaches
when consulting appellate case law. This eventually led to the
genesis of a third, middle-ground approach involving a "totality
of the circumstances" assessment of each individual case. The
strict liability scheme intended by Congress has been virtually
abandoned by the modern judiciary, replaced with a trend to-
ward a case-by-case analysis that specifically considers the in-
tent, knowledge, and ownership interests of the parties.
This Note traces the evolution of CERCLA's liability scheme
since the statute's inception. It begins with a brief history of
CERCLA and a short description of the traditional framework
for statutory interpretation. The Note then describes the various
approaches the courts have adopted in holding CERCLA "ar-
rangers" liable: strict liability; specific intent; and a "totality of
the circumstances," or case-by-case analysis.
This Note argues that sufficient evidence exists, both in the
statute and in the legislative history, to show that Congress in-
tended to hold CERCLA "arrangers" strictly liable. This Note
also postulates that Judge Posner's decision was an unjustified
3. See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993).
Posner's opinion in this case subsequently became the precedent for a narrow inter-
pretation of CERCLA arranger liability. See infra notes 82-100 and accompanying
text.
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judicial deviation from the virtually universal approach of strict
liability previously applied by the courts. Finally, this Note rec-
ommends that the United States Supreme Court resolve the dif-
ferent approaches the federal appellate courts have adopted in
interpreting CERCLA arranger liability by applying the strict
liability scheme referenced in the statutory wording and intend-
ed by the federal legislature.
HISTORY OF CERCLA
At the time of CERCLA's enactment in 1980, the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency (EPA) estimated that the United States
produced fifty-seven million metric tons of hazardous waste per
year, or about six hundred pounds per citizen.4 The EPA also
calculated that ninety percent of this waste was being disposed
of by U.S. farmers, manufacturers, and producers in environ-
mentally unsound ways.5 Improper disposal methods and aban-
doned waste disposal sites resulted in pollution of surface water
and groundwater, causing "contamination of drinking water sup-
plies, destruction of fish, wildlife and vegetation, and threats to
public safety due to health hazards and threats of fires and ex-
plosions.'
CERCLA was passed in the wake of several nationally publi-
cized "environmental disasters,"' including the infamous Love
4. See SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS, ENVIRONMENTAL
EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACT, S. REP. NO. 96-848, at 3 (1980) [hereinafter S. REP. NO.
96-8481, reprinted in SENATE COMI. ON ENVIRONbMENT & PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH
CONG., 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE,
COMPENSATION, AND LIABILrrY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), at 305, 310 (1983) [herein-
after CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
5. See S. REP. No. 96-848, supra note 4, at 3-4, reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 310-11 (identifying unsound disposal methods as
"haphazard land disposal, improper storage of dangerous substances and illicit dump-
ing-).
6. S. REP. No. 96-848, supra note 4, at 4, reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 4, at 311.
7. Lance A. Lawson, Note, Direct Liability as an Arranger Under CERCLA
§ 107(a)(3): The Efficacy of Adhering to the Tenets of Traditional Corporate Law, 71
NOTRE DA E L. REv. 731, 734 (1996). High profile incidents cited by Congress in
proposals for hazardous waste legislation included: the disposal of 17,000 drums of
hazardous waste in the "Valley of the Drums" outside Louisville, Kentucky; the dis-
charge of kepone, a hazardous insecticide, into the James River in Virginia; the
1998]
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Canal tragedy in New York.8 Additionally, the possibility of new
federal legislation governing the release of hazardous substances
gained acceptance in Congress after a series of major maritime
oil spills resulted in the passage of federal bills governing oil
spills and chemical wastes.'
The legislature's purpose in creating CERCLA was two-fold:
First, Congress intended that the federal government be im-
mediately given the tools necessary for a prompt and effective
response to the problems of national magnitude resulting
from hazardous waste disposal. Second, Congress intended
that those responsible for problems caused by the disposal of
chemical poisons bear the costs and responsibility for remedy-
ing the harmful conditions they created.
10
polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contamination of the Hudson River in New York
through the discharge of electric insulating fluid by General Electric; and the con-
tamination of Michigan livestock through ingestion of cattle feed contaminated with
polybrominated biphenyl (PBB), a fire retardant. See S. REP. No. 96-848, supra note
4, at 4, 7-8, reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 311,
314-15.
8. See S. REP. No. 96-848, supra note 4, at 7, reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 314 (claiming that "Love Canal . . . propelled the
problems of inadequate hazardous chemical waste disposal into the national spot-
light").
The Love Canal incident involved an abandoned canal near Niagara Falls that
later was used as a hazardous waste site. In 1953, the canal was filled in and sold
to the city for one dollar; the city then erected a school and playground on the site.
By the spring of 1978, many area homes were deteriorating rapidly. An investigation
found that houses located on the Love Canal site were infiltrated by highly toxic
chemicals that had percolated into their basements. The investigation also revealed
startling health problems, including birth defects, miscarriages, epilepsy, liver abnor-
malities, sores, rectal bleeding, and headaches. The federal government declared a
state of emergency and evacuated area residents. Ultimately, 200 homes were aban-
doned and the school was closed permanently. See S. REP. No. 96-848, supra note 4,
at 8-9, reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 315-16.
9. See Jeffrey H. Howard & Linda E. Benfeild, CERCLA Liability for Hazardous
Waste "Generators": How Far Does Liability Extend?, 9 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J.
33, 38 & n.37 (1990) (referring to the huge oil spill accidents involving the Torrey
Canyon in 1967, the Argo Merchant in 1976, and the Amoco Cadiz in 1978); see also
S. REP. No. 96-848, supra note 4, at 7, reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTO-
RY, supra note 4, at 314 (discussing a 1978 Senate proposal to expand the Clean
Water Act).
10. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.
Minn. 1982), quoted in Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805
F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986). Many courts have cited this passage when defining
the two main policy objectives of CERCLA. See 1 ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW,
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Few could disapprove of such laudatory goals, developed to coun-
ter a burgeoning environmental problem that squarely confront-
ed the nation." After all, "legislative and judicial pronounce-
ments that 'the polluter should pay' resonate with deep chords of
fairness and justice." 2
CERCLA authorized the EPA to clean up hazardous waste
sites 3 and created a "Superfund" with which to fund its activi-
ties.'4 The financing for Superfund came from a combination of
appropriations, industry taxes, and judgments received through
legal actions to recover response costs from those responsible for
the creation of the hazardous waste sites. 5
Many courts have criticized the congressional drafting of
CERCLA."6 The language of the statute, believed inartful by
some critics, 7 was the product of a lame-duck Congress" and
SUPERFUND LAW AND PROCEDURE § 1.1, at 6 n.16 (1992). Congress stated similar
goals when considering amendments to the statute in 1985. See HOUSE COMM. ON
THE JUDICIARY, SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS OF 1985, H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at
15 (1985) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 99-253(111)], reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3038, 3038, and in SENATE COMM. ON ENVRONMENT & PUBLIC WORKS, 101ST CONG.,
3 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS AND REAUTHORI7ATION
ACT OF 1986 (PUBLIC LAW 99-499), at 2213, 2227 (1990) [hereinafter SARA LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY] (noting that Congress's goals in enacting CERCLA were: "(1) to pro-
vide for clean-up if a hazardous substance is released into the environment or if
such release is threatened, and (2) to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of
these clean-ups").
11. See Oswald, supra note 1, at 635.
12. Id.
13. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-05 (1994).
14. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1994). The creation of this "Superfimd" led many to
refer to "CERCLA" as "Superfund." See 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 10, § 1.1, at 2
& n.2.
15. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507(b).
16. See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA's Mistakes, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1405,
1405 & n.3 (1997) (citing multiple cases); cf Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Writing
Statutes, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 627, 636 (1987) ("To get two separate majorities to
agree separately on a single set of words to convey a clear and complete idea-and
then to get the President to sign such a miracle-is not easy."). Mikva went on to
state:
We certainly should not be critical of ambiguity of [statutory] language.
Sometimes that is the only way a bill can pass-by sloughing over the
hard parts and dulling the bright lines we would like to see. It is then
for us, the judges, to try to find out what holes must be left to future
policy-making and what gaps require immediate filling.
Id. at 637.
17. See Nagle, supra note 16, at 1405-06.
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a lame-duck President 9 intent on passing comprehensive envi-
ronmental legislation before the end of the Ninety-sixth Con-
gress.2' Based on the remedial nature of the statute, courts
have interpreted CERCLA to provide broad coverage. 2' As a
consequence of the unusually rapid passage of the legislation,
however, little legislative history exists to guide the courts in
interpreting the statute.22 "The controversial nature of the vari-
ous CERCLA bills and the political complexities caused by the
18. See Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL.
L. 1, 19 (1982) ("[Tlhe actions of the Senate in November and December of 1980
were distinctly the transactions of a lame duck legislature.").
19. See 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 10, § 1.1, at 2 (stating that the legislation
was signed by President Carter on December 11, 1980 as one of his final acts in
office).
20. See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080
(1st Cir. 1986) ("CERCLA was ... enacted as a 'last-minute compromise' between
three competing bills . . . ." (quoting United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898,
905 (D.N.H. 1985))); Nagle, supra note 16, at 1405-06 ('The usual explanation for
CERCLA's poor drafting blames the hurry with which the lame-duck Ninety-sixth
Congress passed the hazardous waste law in December 1980 before President-elect
Reagan and a Republican Senate majority assumed office.").
21. See, e.g., Dedham, 805 F.2d at 1081 ("CERCLA is essentially a remedial stat-
ute designed by Congress to protect and preserve public health and the environment.
We are therefore obligated to construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of
the beneficial legislative purposes."). This interpretation of remedial statutes con-
forms with traditional statutory construction tenets. See, e.g., 2A NORMAN J. SINGER,
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 45.02, 45.05 (5th ed. 1992) (explaining
that when statutory language is ambiguous, courts look to legislative intent and, in
doing so, look to Congress's intended objective). In the CERCLA context, federal ap-
pellate courts consistently have supported this approach. See Blake A. Watson, Lib-
eral Construction of CERCLA Under the Remedial Purpose Canon: Have the Lower
Courts Taken a Good Thing Too Far?, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 262 (1996).
The environmental statute . . . that most frequently triggers the employ-
ment of the remedial purpose canon by federal district and appellate
courts is CERCLA. Although the courts only began construing CERCLA
in the early 1980s, every circuit that has considered the Act has pro-
duced decisions in which the canon has played an interpretive role.
Id. (footnote omitted). CERCLA represents the "best-case scenario" for the employ-
ment of the remedial purpose canon. See generally id. at 271-97 (discussing "judicial
application of the remedial purpose canon in CERCLA cases").
22. No committee or conference reports exist that address the version of the legis-
lation that ultimately became law. See 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 10, § 1.1, at 5.
Additionally, some believe that the available reports concerning prior versions of the
statute are of little value in interpreting CERCLA because the previous proposals
"differed significantly" from the final legislation. See id. § 1.1, at 4-5.
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change in control of the Senate following the November, 1980
election[] are largely responsible for its enigmatic legislative his-
tory."
The sponsors of CERCLA crafted the statute's liability scheme
with an anticipation that the common law would provide guid-
ance in interpreting the legislation.' As the courts have opined
their disparate interpretations of CERCLA, Congress has consid-
ered making drastic changes to CERCLA's liability scheme.'
Some have viewed Congress's failure to alter the original
statute's liability standard appreciably as an indication that it is
satisfied with CERCLA's language and with the interpretations
of the statute's language by the courts.26
Unfortunately, judicial opinions under CERCLA have been far
from uniform." "Lacking direction from the traditional tools of
statutory construction, and unable to wait for Congress to cor-
rect the errors, the courts interpreting CERCLA muddle
along."2' Not surprisingly, there has been considerable litiga-
tion concerning the interpretation of this sweeping legislation, 9
resulting in inconsistent decisions and significant jurisdictional
differences. Such interpretive incongruities are blatantly evident
in CERCLA arranger liability case law.30
23. Howard & Benfeild, supra note 9, at 38.
24. See, e.g., Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155,
157 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that sponsors of the statute expected courts to turn to
common law analogies) (citing Colorado v. ASARCO, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1488-
89 (D. Colo. 1985) (quoting statements given on the floor of the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate)); see also infra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing
the courts' role in developing CERCLA through case law).
25. See Nagle, supra note 16, at 1423 & n.83 (noting that "Congress has reviewed
numerous proposals to completely overhaul CERCLA's liability scheme").
26. See id. at 1423. The original statute was amended in 1986; these amendments
did not, however, affect the liability scheme of the original statute. See Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)).
27. See Nagle, supra note 16, at 1410.
28. Id.
29. See 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 10, at vi (stating that in its first 10 years,
CERCLA generated over one thousand reported decisions and, as of 1992, that num-
ber increased by almost one every court work day).
30. See infra notes 59144 and accompanying text.
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FRAMEWORK FOR STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The Statute
CERCLA is a complex and technical statute3' that imposes
liability on four classes of potentially responsible parties: (1) cur-
rent owners and operators of hazardous waste producers; (2)
former owners or operators of hazardous waste producers; (3)
"arrangers" of hazardous substance disposal or treatment; and
(4) transporters of hazardous waste. 2 An "arranger" is defined
in the statute as
any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise ar-
ranged for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a trans-
porter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazardous
substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other
party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or
operated by another party or entity and containing such haz-
ardous substances.33
Although the act broadly defines "person" to include individu-
als as well as corporations and other business entities, 4 it un-
fortunately offers no definition of "arranged for." This shortcom-
ing has led some to conclude that defining "arranged for" is
"problematic," and has subjected CERCLA arranger liability to
substantial judicial interpretation.35 In addition, there is dis-
31. See 1 RICHARD H. MAYS, CERCLA LITIGATION, ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLI-
ANCE § 1.01, at 1-1 (1995).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
33. Id. § 9607(a)(3) (emphasis added). The statutory language does not require the
"arranger" to have "produced" the hazardous materials; thus, liability extends to op-
erators of storage facilities and to property owners who inherit wastes from previous
occupants. See Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1458, 1516 (1986). The most common example of an "arranger" is a "generator" of
hazardous substances, such as a manufacturing facility that ships its hazardous
wastes to off-site facilities for treatment or disposal. See 1 MAYS, supra note 31, §
7.05, at 7-7.
34. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994).
35. See Anna Marple Buboise, Comment, Expanding the Scope of Arranger Liabili-
ty Under CERCLA, 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 469, 473 (1995) ("The most problematic com-
ponent of section 9607(a)(3), and that which is most subject to judicial interpretation,
is the phrase 'or otherwise arranged for disposal.'" (citing Jeffrey M. Gaba, Interpret-
ing Section 107(A)(3) of CERCLA: When Has a Person 'Arranged for Disposal?", 44
Sw. L.J. 1313, 1314 (1991))). More "arrangers" have been held liable under CERCLA
286 [Vol. 40:279
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agreement over the statute's application in the traditional corpo-
rate environment of limited liability, resulting in disagreement
among the courts as to whether liability can extend to corporate
officers, directors, and shareholders." Finally, CERCLA speci-
fies only four narrow defenses against liability. 7
Plain and Ordinary Meaning
There is a "strong presumption that Congress expresses its
intent through the language it chooses." 8 Further, when a stat-
ute is clear.and unambiguous on its face, a court need not, and
indeed cannot, interpret its language.39 When a statute re-
than parties in any of the other three classes subject to CERCLA's prohibitions. See
1 MAYS, supra note 31, § 7.05, at 7-7.
36. See generally Lawson, supra note 7 (recommending an approach with respect
to corporate liability).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (listing as defenses: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of
war; (3) an act or omission of a third party; and (4) any combination of the preced-
ing three defenses). See generally Brian J. Pinkowski, Simplifying CERCLA Defenses
to Liability, 28 URB. LAW. 197 (1996) (describing the defenses in detail). Some con-
sider an "innocent purchaser" to be a fifth defense. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 7,
at 737 & n.33 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(b)); cf 1 MAYS, supra note 31, § 7.12, at
7-21 (claiming that the "innocent purchaser" defense is a variation of the "third par-
ty" defense); 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 10, § 5.6, at 433 (explaining that "inno-
cent purchasers" are not bound by CERCLA based on the statute's definition of "con-
tractual relationship," which was added in 1986). The legislative history of The
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 supports Topol and Snow's
interpretation. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 99-962, SUPERFUND AmENDmENTS AND
REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1986, at 186-88 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3276, 3279-81, and in 6 SARA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 4818, 5002-
04.
38. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 n.12 (1987); see also Escondido
Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772 (1984)
("Since it should be generally assumed that Congress expresses its purposes through
the ordinary meaning of the words it uses, . . . '[aibsent a clearly expressed legisla-
tive intention to the contrary, [statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive.'" (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 312 (1983))).
39. See 2A SINGER, supra note 21, § 45.02, at 5. The Supreme Court has endorsed
the use of this canon of statutory construction.
[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardi-
nal canon before all others. We have stated time and again that courts
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and
means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: "judicial inquiry is
complete."
Connecticut Nal Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (citations omitted)
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quires interpretation due to its ambiguity, however, it is undeni-
ably the duty of the judiciary to interpret it. 40
"When a word is not defined by statute, [courts] normally con-
strue it in accord with its ordinary or natural meaning."4' Stat-
utes sometimes use words in nonstandard senses, however, and
do so without the benefit of a definitional section; this is true in
CERCJA, which does not specifically define "arranged for."42
Additionally, courts may be unable to discern a universal inter-
pretation of the statutory language, potentially producing con-
flicting guidance for those ultimately bound by the legislation."
Legislative Intent
Although judges typically prefer the legal certainty that comes
with the stable body of rules accompanying the administration of
common law, jurisprudence regarding statutes often precludes
such certainty.44 It therefore is necessary, when "interpreting
statutes, [that] judges achieve the democratic ideal through a
search for and understanding of legislative intent and goals."45
(quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)).
40. See 2A SINGER, supra note 21, § 45.03, at 17-19.
41. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993). This canon of interpretation
has come to be known as "the plain meaning rule." See 2A SINGER, supra note 21, §
46.01, at 81.
42. See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993) (at-
tempting to define "arranged for" in the context of CERCLA liability).
43. As stated by Justice Holmes: "A word is not a crystal, transparent and un-
changed, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and con-
tent according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used." Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
44. See Mikva, supra note 16, at 627; see also J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 292
(1950) ([T~he legislature makes new rules, frequently without adequate consider-
ation, which upset legal certainty. The legislatures do their work capriciously, super-
ficially, on the basis of the limited subjective impressions of a few members of a
legislative committee. Why should we [as judges] greatly respect such shoddy prod-
ucts?"), quoted in Mikva, supra note 16, at 627.
45. Id. at 628. Having served five terms in the United States Congress, five terms
in the Illinois legislature, as a judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit, and as head counsel to President Clinton, Abner Mikva
possesses a unique perspective regarding the role of legislative intent in judicial pro-
ceedings. See id. at 627 n.*; see also 2A SINGER, supra note 21, § 45.05, at 22
("When a question arises concerning applicability of a statute a decision can be
reached only byapplying some kind of a criterion. For the interpretation of statutes,
'intent of the legislature' is the criterion that is most often recited.").
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The legislative history of a statute is always important in deter-
mining the legislative intent behind its implementation."
In the case of CERCLA, "a hastily assembled bill and a frag-
mented legislative history add to the usual difficulty of discern-
ing the full meaning of the law. ' Many have concluded, there-
fore, that CERCLA's legislative history offers little guidance in
ascertaining the meaning of "arranged for."" Moreover, the per-
ception that CERCLA's legislative history is contradictory fur-
ther eviscerates its usefulness in interpreting the statute.4 9
There are, however, those in the judiciary who believe that "the constitutionally
mandated role of the Court is only to interpret laws-the actual statutory lan-
guage-rather than to reconstruct legislators' intentions." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR.,
DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 226 (1994) (explaining Justice Scalia's view-
point). Scalia himself notes that courts do not really look for subjective legislative
intent, but rather look for an "objectified" intent. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17 (1997). Justice Scalia has stated:
[Ilt is simply incompatible with democratic government, or indeed, even
with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined by what
the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated....
Men [and women] may intend what they will; but it is only the laws
that they enact which bind us.
Id. Proponents of 'new textualism" argue that legislative history, unlike statutory
language, has not been subject to bicameralism and presentment requirements. See
ESKRIDGE, supra, at 226 (analogizing this argument to the Supreme Court's invalida-
tion of legislative vetoes in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)). Although the Su-
preme Court has been more reluctant to consult legislative history since Justice
Scalia joined the Court, it still does so in a significant number of cases. See id. at
227 fig. 7.2 (illustrating that the Court consulted legislative history in over 15% of
its statutory cases in 1991, the most recent year for which data was available).
Eskridge also provides credible criticisms for Justice Scalia's constitutional justifica-
tions for the new textualism. See id. at 230-38. Further,
even [Justice Scalia] probably would agree that a dictionary definition will
not always answer the difficult interpretive questions, and would admit
that context is necessary. Like the defenders of legislative history, there-
fore, Scalia admits "coherence" arguments, that is, arguments that an am-
biguous term is rendered clear if one possible definition is more coherent
with the surrounding legal terrain than other possible definitions.
Id. at 226.
46. See Grad, supra note 18, at 2.
47. Id. Because there was too little time remaining in the congressional session
for a conference, the final statute lacked the standard committee and conference re-
ports addressing the legislation. See 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 10, § 1.1, at 5.
48. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 n.8 (8th
Cir. 1989); accord Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d 1209,
1221 (3d Cir. 1993); Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 922 F.2d 1240, 1247 (6th
Cir. 1991); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1039-42 (2d Cir. 1985).
49. See Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1080
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Judicial Interpretation
Discerning the meaning and intent of statutes necessarily in-
volves matters of judgment on which informed opinions may
honestly disagree; hence, judicial interpretations of statutes will
not always be concordant." A court must find and enforce stop-
ping points regarding liability to the same extent that it must
implement other legislative choices. 51  Interpretation of
CERCLA's statutory language concerning liability has proved
particularly challenging, however, because "the lower federal
courts cannot turn to past Supreme Court cases or to existing
administrative interpretations for guidance."52
With arguably ambiguous statutory language and inade-
quate legislative guidance, the courts have resorted to their
own perceptions and interpretations regarding CERCLA. As
a result, copious case law exists concerning owner," suc-
cessor,54  governmental,55  and arranger" liability under
(lst Cir. 1986) ("We recognize that 'CERCLA has acquired a well-deserved notoriety
for vaguely drafted provisions and an indefinite, if not contradictory, legislative his-
tory.'" (quoting United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D.N.H. 1985))).
50. See 2A SINGER, supra note 21, § 45.03, at 17, 19.
51. See Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 861 F.2d 155, 157
(7th Cir. 1988).
52. Nagle, supra note 16, at 1410.
53. See generally William B. Johnson, Annotation, What Constitutes 'Disposal" for
Purposes of Owner or Operator Liability Under § 107(a)(2) of Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.S. §
9607(a)(2)), 136 A.L.R. FED. 117 (1997) (explaining owner and operator liability un-
der CERCLA).
54. See generally William B. Johnson, Annotation, Liability of Parent or Successor
Corporation, or Corporate Shareholders, in Action Pursuant to Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.S. §§
9601-9675), 121 A.L.R. FED. 173 (1994) (explaining parent or successor liability un-
der CERCLA).
55. See generally William B. Johnson, Annotation, Liability of Local Government
Under § 107(a) of Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liabil-
ity Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.S. § 9607(a)), 133 A.L.R. FED. 293 (1996) (explaining
governmental liability under CERCLA).
56. See generally William B. Johnson, Annotation, Arranger Liability of
Nongenerators Pursuant to § 107(a)(3) of Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.S. § 9607(a)(3)), 132 A.L.R.
FED. 77 (1996) (explaining the potential liability of entities that did not generate
hazardous waste under CERCLA); William B. Johnson, Annotation, Arranger Liabili-
ty of State Government Under § 107(a) of Comprehensive Environmental Response,
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CERCLA." It therefore should come as no surprise that judicial
approaches to arranger liability have not been consistent. Mod-
ern courts have adopted three fundamentally dissimilar ap-
proaches: (1) a strict liability approach; (2) a specific intent ap-
proach; and (3) a "totality of the circumstances," case-by-case
approach.58
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF "ARRANGED FOR"
The Broad Interpretation
Courts often cite United States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemi-
cals Corp.59 for the proposition that arrangers are subject to
strict liability under CERCLA." In Aceto, the EPA and the
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.S. § 9607(a)), 130 A.L.R. FED.
431 (1996) (explaining governmental arranger liability under CERCLA); William B.
Johnson, Annotation, Liability of Generators Pursuant to § 107(a)(3) of Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) (42 U.S.C.S. §
9607(a)(3)), 126 A.L.R. FED. 265 (1995) (explaining generator liability under
CERCLA).
57. See Lawrence S. Coven, Comment, Liability Under CERCLA. After a Decade of
Delegation, the Time is Ripe for Legislative Reform, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 165, 166
(1990) ("Liability under environmental law is constantly being litigated and places
itself in the forefront of contemporary legal issues.").
58. See United States v. Gordon Stafford, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 337, 339-40 (N.D. W.
Va. 1997); accord Mathews v. Dow Chem. Co., 947 F. Supp. 1517, 1523-25 (D. Colo.
1996).
59. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
60. See, e.g., Gordon Stafford, 952 F. Supp. at 340 ("In finding the pesticide man-
ufacturers had 'arranged for' the disposal of wastes, the Eighth Circuit did not re-
quire the United States to show that the pesticide manufacturers intended for the
wastes to be disposed."). Although the Aceto court was not the first to apply strict
arranger liability under CERCLA, it was the first federal appellate court to do so
expressly. See generally Anita Letter, Comment, Reasonable Inference of Authority to
Control Hazardous Waste Disposal Results in Potential Liability: United States v.
Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corporation, 31 NAT. RESOURCES J. 673 (1991) (docu-
menting the judicial trend of expanding CERCLA arranger liability); Kim
Ruckdaschel-Haley, Note, "Arranging for Disposal of Hazardous Substances": Expan-
sive CERCLA Liability for Pesticide Manufacturers After U.S. v. Aceto Agricultural
Chemicals Corp., 35 S.D. L. REV. 251 (1990) (pointing out that Aceto's expansive
view was consistent with prior case law and provided a logical extension to the
growing scope of CERCLA arranger liability).
Strict liability, or "liability without fault," has been defined as "liability that is
imposed on an actor apart from either (1) an intent to interfere with a legally pro-
tected interest without a legal justification to do so, or (2) a breach of a duty to
exercise reasonable care, i.e., actionable negligence." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
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State of Iowa attempted to recover over ten million dollars in
response costs incurred in the clean up of Aidex Corporation's
(Aidex) contaminated pesticide formulation facility in Mills
County, Iowa.6 Aidex operated the site from 1974 until it went
bankrupt in 1981.62 EPA investigations in the early 1980s re-
vealed that the site was highly contaminated:"3 "[H]azardous
substances were found in deteriorating containers, in the surface
soil, in fauna samples, and in the shallow zone of the groundwa-
ter, threatening the source of irrigation and drinking water for
area residents."64 According to the EPA and the State of Iowa,
six pesticide manufacturers that contracted with Aidex to formu-
late their technical grade pesticides into commercial grade pesti-
cides "arranged for" hazardous waste disposal.65 The manufac-
turers retained ownership of the pesticides throughout the treat-
ment process and supplied the specifications for the commercial
grade products.66 Additionally, the manufacturing formulation
process inherently generated hazardous wastes. 7
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by
stating that "[M]ost courts have held [that] CERCLA imposes
strict liability."6 It found that the broad language used in the
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 534 (5th ed. 1984) (emphasis
added).
61. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1375. As stated in Aceto:
[I]t is a common practice in the pesticide industry for manufacturers of
active pesticide ingredients to contract with formulators such as Aidex to
produce a commercial grade product which may then be sold to farmers
and other consumers. Formulators mix the manufacturer's active ingredi-
ents with inert materials using the specifications provided by the manu-
facturer. The resulting commercial grade product is then packaged by the
formulator and either shipped back to the manufacturer or shipped di-
rectly to customers of the manufacturer.
Id. (citations omitted).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at 1376.
66. See id. at 1383.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 1377 (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810
F.2d 726, 732 n.3 (8th Cir. 1986); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1042 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808-10
(S.D. Ohio 1983)).
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statute to describe arranger liability indicated that "a liberal
judicial interpretation [was] consistent with CERCLA's 'over-
whelmingly remedial' statutory scheme."6 9 Further, the court
stated that "[other] courts have not hesitated to look beyond
defendants' characterizations to determine whether a
transaction in fact involves an arrangement for the disposal of a
hazardous substance.
°70
The Eighth Circuit noted that other courts have held defen-
dants liable as arrangers under CERCLA even when they at-
tempted to define their relationship with the party that disposed
of their hazardous substances as a buy-sell relationship instead
of one of disposal.7' It also pointed out that defendants can be
held liable for "arranging for" waste disposal even if they had no
actual knowledge that the substances would be deposited illegal-
ly.72 The court in Aceto noted, however, that other courts have
69. Id. at 1380 (quoting Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d at 733).
70. Id. at 1381 (citing United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., 619 F. Supp. 162,
237-41 (W.D. Mo. 1985)). In Conservation Chemical, the sale of lime slurry and fly
ash by-products to treat other hazardous substances at a hazardous waste site con-
stituted "arranging for disposal" of hazardous materials. See Conservation Chemical,
619 F. Supp. at 241. The court based liability on the fact that the sellers of the
lime slurry and fly ash contracted "for deposit or placement" of their hazardous sub-
stances on the site. Id.
71. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381 (citing New York v. General Elec. Co., 592 F.
Supp. 291, 297 (N.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp.
842, 845 (S.D. Ill. 1984)). In General Electric, the district court determined that
when General Electric sold used transformer oil containing PCBs and other hazard-
ous substances to a dragstrip to be used for dust control, the company may have
"arranged for" the dragstrip to take away its used transformer oil with "knowledge
or imputed knowledge" that the oil would be deposited on the land surrounding the
dragstrip. General Electric, 592 F. Supp. at 297. In A & F Materials Co., the district
court held McDonnell Douglas liable as an arranger when it sold spent aluminum
etch caustic solution to A & F for oil reclamation use. See A & F Materials Co., 582
F. Supp. at 845.
The Eighth Circuit noted the General Electric court's reference to CERCLA's
legislative history: "'[Plersons cannot escape liability by "contracting away" their re-
sponsibility or alleging that the incident was caused by the act or omission of a
third party." Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381 (quoting S. REP. No. 96-848, supra note 4, at
31, reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 338, quoted in
General Electric, 592 F. Supp. at 297).
72. See Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381 (citing United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884,
895 (E.D.N.C. 1985); Missouri v. Independent Petrochemical Corp., 610 F. Supp. 4, 5
(E.D. Mo. 1985); United States v. Wade, 577 F. Supp. 1326, 1333 n.3 (E.D. Pa.
1983)).
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not imposed liability when a "useful" substance was sold to a
third party, which then incorporated the material into a product
that was disposed of at a later date.7' The Eighth Circuit ap-
parently considered "useful" sales of hazardous materials to be
the limit for imposing CERCLA arranger liability.
The court also was careful to distinguish Aceto from its earlier
decision in United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chemical Co.74 (NEPACCO), in which it stated that "[i]t is the
authority to control the handling and disposal of hazardous sub-
stances, that is critical under the statutory scheme."75 The
Eighth Circuit noted that in NEPACCO, it imposed liability on,
in addition to owners, individuals who had "the authority to con-
trol the disposal, even without ownership or possession."76
In short, the Eighth Circuit held that, under CERCLA, "ar-
ranged for" does not require an intent to dispose of hazardous
73. See id. (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., [19881 27
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1558 (S.D. Fla. 1988), affd, 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990);
Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 654-57 (N.D.
Ill.), affd on other grounds, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., [1983] 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1983)). n Flori-
da Power, the court held that Allis-Chalmers' sale of "new" electrical transformers,
containing PCB-contaminated mineral oil, to Florida Power did not expose Allis-
Chalmers to arranger liability when Florida Power disposed of the transformers up
to 40 years later. See Florida Power, [1988] 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1560
("[Previous] cases have consistently held that intent to dispose, and foreseeability of
the eventual need to dispose are irrelevant under CERCLA. They have held that
sale of a useful product containing a contaminant does not subject the seller to
CERCLA liability."). In Edward Hines, the court held that the plaintiff, a wood sup-
ply company, could not collect from its wood preservative chemical supplier because
the supplier did not "arrange for" disposal or treatment of hazardous substances un-
der CERCLA. See Edward Hines, 861 F.2d at 157. The court did not impose liability
despite the fact that the supplier designed and built the preservation plant, fur-
nished the toxic chemical, trained Edward Hines's employees, and reserved a right
to inspect ongoing operations. See id. Similarly, the Westinghouse court concluded
that Monsanto was not liable for providing PCB-contaminated dielectric fluid to
Westinghouse by stating that "[tihe claims of the United States are not based on its
control of the manufactured product of Monsanto as sold to Westinghouse but are
based on Westinghouse's waste product disposition in issue." Westinghouse, [1983] 22
Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1233.
74. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
75. Id. at 743, quoted in Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381-82.
76. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1382.
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waste.7 It emphasized that requiring an intent to arrange for
disposal would frustrate CERCLA's goal of requiring responsible
parties to pay for hazardous substance cleanup."8 Following the
Eighth Circuit's decision, both the Ninth 9 and Eleventh"0 Cir-
cuit Courts of Appeals cited Aceto's broad interpretation of
CERCLA arranger liability with approval, imposing strict liabili-
ty under the statute. A number of other courts also have fol-
lowed this strict liability approach.8
77. See id. at 1380.
78. See id.
79. See Jones-Hamilton Co. v. Beazer Materials & Serv. Inc., 973 F.2d 688, 695
(9th Cir. 1992). In this case, Jones-Hamilton, a contract chemical formulator, entered
into a formulation agreement with Wood Treating Chemicals Co., a predecessor to
Beazer, to formulate raw materials, which Beazer had provided, into wood preserva-
tion compounds. See id. at 691. The contract permitted a tolerance of up to 2% by
volume for spillage or shrinkage during any calendar month, and Beazer retained
ownership of all materials it supplied to Jones-Hamilton. See id, Beazer later dis-
charged hazardous substances into waste water containment ponds, requiring over
two million dollars in cleanup costs. See id.
The court found the issues very similar to Aceto and agreed with the Eighth
Circuit that requiring "intent" would frustrate CERCLA's goal of making the compa-
nies that were responsible for producing hazardous waste pay for cleanup. See id. at
695 (citing Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1380). Relying on Aceto and the wording of the stat-
ute, the court found that "it is clear that under the agreement Beazer 'arranged for
disposal' of toxic substances within the meaning of section 9607." Id.
80. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1318
(11th Cir. 1990) ("In light of the broad remedial nature of CERCLA, we conclude, as
other courts have, that even though a manufacturer does not make the critical deci-
sions as to how, when, and by whom a hazardous substance is to be disposed, the
manufacturer may be liable.").
81. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir.
1993). In Alcan, the Second Circuit held that to impose strict liability under
CERCLA,
the government need only prove: (1) there was a release or threatened
release, which (2) caused incurrence of response costs, and (3) that the
defendant generated hazardous waste at the clean-up site .... Hence, it
seems plain that in addition to imposing a strict liability scheme,
CERCLA does away with a causation requirement.
Id. at 721; see also United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 264 (3d
Cir. 1992) (finding that the statute "imposes no such causation requirement, but
rather requires that the plaintiff in a CERCLA proceeding establish that the release
or threatened release caused the incurrence of response costs").
Additionally, some feel that Aceto and its progeny represented a judicial expan-
sion of CERCLA liability. See Buboise, supra note 35, at 477 ("The Aceto line of
cases confirms courts' willingness to extend CERCLA liability to parties engaging in
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The Narrow Interpretation
On the opposite end of the causation spectrum, Judge Richard
Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in
1993, contravened existing precedent by adopting a specific in-
tent approach regarding CERCLA arranger liability in Amcast
Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp.82 In Amcast, Elkhart Products
Corporation (Elkhart), a subsidiary of Amcast Industrial Corpo-
ration (Amcast), manufactured copper fittings at a plant in Indi-
ana using the solvent trichloroethylene (TCE), a hazardous sub-
stance.83 One of the chemical manufacturers from which
Elkhart had purchased liquid TCE was Detrex Corporation
(Detrex); Detrex either delivered the TCE in its own tanker
trucks or hired a common carrier to deliver the solvent."4 In
1984, almost eight hundred gallons of TCE were discovered in
the groundwater beneath a pharmaceutical plant adjacent to
Elkhart's plant."5 Evidence suggested that drivers from both
Detrex and the common carrier accidentally spilled TCE on
Elkhart's premises while filling Elkhart's storage tanks, result-
ing in severe environmental contamination.86
The Seventh Circuit determined that Detrex was not liable
because it did not hire the transporter for the purpose of spilling
817TCE on Elkhart's premises. The court stated that although
transactions intended primarily to produce useful materials that also result in waste
disposal.").
82. 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993). Shortly after the Amcast decision, legal scholars
recognized Posner's opinion as a deviation from over a decade of previous case law
upholding strict CERCLA arranger liability. See generally Beth A. Caretti, Note,
Amicast Industrial Corp. v. Detrex Corp.: The Shippers Exception to CERCLA and
How it Compares in "Arranging For" Environmental Liability, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 227
(1994) (pointing out that Amcasts approach to arranger liability deviated from other
circuits and was contrary to the statute's wording and legislative history). Cf T.
Christopher Daniel, Comment, Posner Reigns in CERCLA. Amcast Industrial Corp. &
Elkhart Products Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 9 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 531, 550
(1993-94) (positing that Posner's narrow interpretation was a well-reasoned approach
to ambiguous legislation). Posner's rejection of the strict liability approach of Aceto
and its progeny arguably was without justification. See infra notes 194-221 and ac-
companying text.
83. See Amcast, 2 F.3d at 747.
84. See id. at 747-48.
85. See id. at 748.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 751.
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the statute defines disposal to include spilling, the critical words
in the liability section are "arranged for.""8 The court found
those words to "imply intentional action,"89 a suggestion that
other courts overwhelmingly had rejected. According to Posner,
the sole thing Detrex "arranged for" was the common carrier's
delivery of TCE.0 The court found that Detrex did not "arrange
for" any spilling on Elkhart's premises, and that "disposal" ex-
cludes accidental spillage because no one "arranges for" such
occurrences.9 The court found that the words "arranged with a
transporter for transport for disposal or treatment"92 appeared
to contemplate a case in which an entity that desired to rid itself
of its hazardous wastes hired a transporter to deliver the wastes
to a disposal site, not a case in which the entity provided for
delivery of a useful product as Detrex did in Amcast."
Judge Posner, writing for the court, held that "[i]t would be an
extraordinary thing to make shippers strictly liable under the
Superfund statute for the consequences of accidents to common
carriers or other reputable transportation companies that the
shippers had hired in good faith to ship their products."94 The
court further stated that there were multiple "direct regulatory
controls" governing the transportation of hazardous substances,
88. See id.
89. Id. (emphasis added). The court went on to state that "[no one arranges for
an accident, except in the sinister sense, not involved here, of 'staging' an acci-
dent-that is, causing deliberate harm but making it seem accidental." Id.
90. See id.
91. See id. ("[I]n the context of the shipper who is arranging for the transporta-
tion of a product, 'disposal' excludes accidental spillage because you do not arrange
for an accident except in the jEsopian sense illustrated by the staged accident.").
92. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3) (1994).
93. See Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751.
94. Id. (citing Indiana Harbor Belt R.R. v. American Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d
1174, 1180-81 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that negligence, and not strict liability, was
the proper common law liability standard based on the hazard posed by the material
carried by the shipper)). Indiana Harbor was a non-CERCLA case applying common
law liability. See infra notes 202-04 and accompanying text. It was the only case the
Amcast court cited to support the imposition of a negligence liability scheme. See
Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751. The court simultaneously conceded that the wording of
CERCLA allowed, but did not compel, holding shippers to a strict liability standard.
See id. ("The language of the statute permits but does not compel [strict liability],
and we can find no evidence that it was intended.").
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outlined in the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act,95 and
that based on this fact, the imposition of a specific intent re-
quirement "[did] not create a regulatory void."96
The court ultimately found that Detrex was liable as a "re-
sponsible person" for the spillage from its own trucks but not for
the spillage from the hired common carrier's trucks. 7 Elkhart,
on the other hand, would have to pay for cleanup of any contam-
ination that was caused by the spillage from the common
carrier's trucks unless it could find another responsible person to
whom it could shift that cost. 8 The Seventh Circuit concluded,
therefore, that a party did not "arrange for" disposal of a hazard-
ous substance when it did not intentionally arrange for the haz-
ardous substance being delivered to be spilled on its premises.9
Subsequent to the Seventh Circuit's opinion, other courts relied
on Amcast's holding, and Posner's narrow approach to CERCLA
arranger liability, as talismanic precedent.' 9
95. 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-27 (1994).
96. See Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See, e.g., Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 932 F. Supp. 1328, 1336 (D. Utah
1996) (finding a specific-intent requirement for arranger liability to be compatible
with CERCLA's strict liability scheme because strict liability is not imposed until
one is determined to be a responsible party, and finding a requirement of intentional
action consistent with the plain language of the statute); G.J. Leasing Co. v. Union
Elec. Co., 854 F. Supp. 539, 559 (S.D. Ill. 1994) (determining that "the phrase 'ar-
ranged for' implies intentional action"), affd, 54 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 848 F. -Supp. 1352, 1357 (W.D. Mich. 1994) (holding
that purchasers of drum-delivered solvents were not subjected to arranger liability
when (1) they returned the drums with solvent residue to the producer in exchange
for a deposit, and (2) solvents were released into the environment when the drums
were rinsed by the producer, absent a showing that the purchasers intended to dis-
pose of the residual solvent), rev'd and remanded, 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1996).
A specific-intent rationale also has been used to justify a "useful product" excep-
tion to arranger liability. See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp.,
893 F.2d 1313, 1319 (11th Cir. 1990); accord Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 654 (N.D. Ill.), affd 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988).
The Cello-Foil district court aptly summed up the specific-intent approach to
CERCLA arranger liability: "Whatever else 'otherwise arranged for disposal'
means . . . it does not apply to situations where there was no intent to dispose of a
hazardous substance." Cello-Foil, 848 F. Supp. at 1357. The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals retreated, however, from the district court's hard line stance. See Cello-Foil,
100 F.3d at 1233 ("The district court employed an overly restrictive view on what is
298
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The Middle Ground Interpretation
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found a middle ground
between the strict liability and specific intent approaches to
CERCLA arranger liability when it decided South Florida Water
Management District v. Montalvo."'0 In Montalvo, Chemspray,
owned by Montalvo, formulated pesticides from chemicals. °2
Chemairspray, an aerial spraying service also allegedly con-
trolled by Montalvo, then contracted with area farmers and
ranchers to conduct aerial spraying of their properties.0 3 A
district court found Montalvo, Chemspray, Chemairspray, and
Chemspray's corporate successor, Glades Formulating Corpora-
tion (collectively known as the "Sprayers"), jointly and severally
liable for the hazardous waste cleanup of an airstrip and adja-
cent pesticide storage site.0 4 The Sprayers thereafter sought
contribution for incurred response costs from landowners who
had contracted with them for aerial spraying services. °5 The
airstrip and storage site had become contaminated with pesti-
cide and herbicide wastes due to spillage during Chemairspray's
necessary to prove intent, state of mind, or purpose, by assuming that intent could
not be inferred from the indirect action of the parties.").
101. 84 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1996). Although Montalvo is often cited as the seminal
decision adopting a "totality of the circumstances," case-by-case approach to CERCLA
arranger liability, other federal appellate courts previously had adopted various "mid-
dle-ground" interpretations. See, e.g., United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082,
1088-90 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that a finding of arranger liability requires some
level of actual participation in, or exercise of control over, activities that are causally
connected to, or have some nexus with, the arrangement for disposal of hazardous
substances or the off-site disposal itself (citing United States v. Vertac Chem. Corp.,
46 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v. Gurley, 43 F.3d 1188 (8th Cir. 1994))).
Of note, TIC, Vertac, and Gurley represent a retreat from the Eighth Circuit's strict
liability approach in United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th
Cir. 1989).
Nevertheless, Montalvo signaled a departure from prior precedent regarding
CERCLA arranger liability. See generally Vincent S. Capone, Note, A Preemptive
Limitation of CERCLA Arranger Liability-South Florida Water Management District
v. Montalvo, 16 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 139 (1997) (pointing out that Montalvo
offended the intent of CERCLA as a remedial statute).
102. See Montalvo, 84 F.3d at 404.
103. See id.
104. See id. at 405.
105. See id.
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mixing and loading operations, and rinsing of its planes'
applicating tanks.0 °
The court in Montalvo began its analysis by recognizing the
various approaches courts had utilized in interpreting the
phrase "arranged for" under CERCLA, including consideration of
the sale of a useful product, °7 an intent to dispose,' and
whether the defendant made the "crucial decision" to place haz-
ardous substances in the possession and control of a specific
facility.109 The Eleventh Circuit also pointed out that it had
previously rejected all attempts to substitute a per se rule for ar-
ranger liability under CERCLA, holding instead that courts
must consider all of the facts when deciding each case." ° The
court found that "[f]or the Landowners to have 'arranged for' the
disposal of the pesticide wastes, they must have done more than
simply contract[] for aerial spraying services. The Sprayers must
demonstrate the landowners took some affirmative act to dispose
of the wastes.""' In the instant case, the court found no allega-
tions or evidence from which it could infer that the landowners
had an implicit agreement to dispose of hazardous wastes.'
The Eleventh Circuit distinguished Montalvo from the Eighth
Circuit's approach in Aceto."' The court stated that because
the manufacturers in Aceto supplied chemicals to the formulator,
provided mixing instructions, and retained ownership of the haz-
ardous substances throughout the formulating process, a court
could infer that the manufacturers exercised some control over
the formulator's mixing process."4
106. See id.
107. See id. at 406 (citing AM Int'l, Inc. v. International Forging Equip. Corp., 982
F.2d 989, 999 (6th Cir. 1993); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. United States Gyp-
sum, 711 F. Supp. 1244, 1254 (D.N.J. 1989)).
108. See id. at 406-07 (citing Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751
(7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 848 F. Supp. 1352, 1357
(W.D. Mich. 1994); Edward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp.
651, 654-56 (N.D. Ill.), affd 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988)).
109. See id. at 407 (citing United States v. A & F Materials Co., 582 F. Supp. 842,
845 (S.D. Ill. 1984)).
110. See id. (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d
1313, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 1990)).
111. Id. (citing AM Int'l, 982 F.2d at 999).
112. See id. at 408.
113. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
114. See Montalvo, 84 F.3d at 408 (citing Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1381-82).
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The fact that the landowners in Montalvo owned the pesti-
cides during the application process did not alone suggest the
type of control over the Sprayers' application procedures that the
chemical manufacturers in Aceto had retained."5 The court
reasoned that, unlike the Eighth Circuit in Aceto, it could not in-
fer that the landowners in Montalvo knew that spraying pesti-
cides entailed spilling hazardous substances and draining con-
taminated rinse water."6 The Eleventh Circuit therefore did
not find the landowners liable as arrangers."'
In short, the court held that "[w]hen determining whether a
party has 'arranged for' the disposal of a hazardous substance,
courts must focus on all of the facts in a particular case.""' The
court recognized that factors such as knowledge of the disposal,
ownership of the hazardous substances, and intent are germane
to the determination of whether the hazardous substance dispos-
al had been "arranged for";". however, it stated that those fac-
tors do not necessarily determine liability in each case.20
The Modern Trend (A Case-By-Case Analysis)
The Eleventh Circuit's reasoning in South Florida Water Man-
agement District v. Montalvo2' provided courts a third avail-
able approach with which to analyze CERCLA arranger liabili-
ty."'22 With its inherent judicial flexibility, other courts quickly
adopted this case-by-case approach. 2 '
115. See id.
116. See id. at 409.
117. See id.
118. Id. at 407 (emphasis added). Later decisions have referred to the Eleventh
Circuit's approach to CERCLA arranger liability in Montalvo as the "totality of the
circumstances" or "case-by-case" approach. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon Stafford,
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 337, 340 (N.D. W. Va. 1997).
119. See Montalvo, 84 F.3d at 407.
120. See id.
121. 84 F.3d 402 (11th Cir. 1996).
122. See Mathews v. Dow Chem. Co., 947 F. Supp. 1517, 1523 (D. Colo. 1996) (re-
ferring to Montalvo, Aceto, and Amcast as "three leading cases ... that have each
taken different approaches in interpreting 'arranged for'").
123. See, e.g., Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., Inc., 990 F.
Supp. 1473, 1479 (M.D. Ga. 1998) ("Whether arranger status is found must depend
upon the particular facts of each case, using the guidelines of the relevant caselaw
along with other pertinent factors in each individual instance." (citing Montalvo, 84
1998]
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In United States v. Gordon Stafford, Inc., a case of first im-
pression for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia
adopted the Eleventh Circuit's approach. 124 Defendant Gordon
Stafford purchased eleven electrical transformers at a public
surplus auction and resold them to co-defendant Gary
Powell. 125 Powell subsequently had tests performed on the
transformers and discovered that PCBs had contaminated seven
of the eleven units.'26 Stafford and Powell discussed the situa-
tion and thereafter instructed a third party to remove the trans-
formers, along with two fifty-five gallon drums of hazardous ma-
terials, from Powell's facility and dispose of the items at a site in
Harrison County, West Virginia.'27
The district court reviewed the various approaches to
CERCLA arranger liability previously used by other courts: the
Eighth Circuit's strict liability approach in Aceto;121 the Sev-
enth Circuit's specific intent approach in Amcast;129 and the
Eleventh Circuit's "totality of the circumstances," case-by-case
approach in Montalvo."° The district court then adopted the
Eleventh Circuit's approach, stating that based on the facts of
F.3d at 407)); Gordon Stafford, 952 F. Supp. at 339-40; Mathews, 947 F. Supp. at
1523-25. In United States v. North Landing Line Construction Co., 3 F. Supp. 2d
694 (E.D. Va. 1998), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia decided not to apply the Montalvo "totality of the circumstances" test, finding
that the defendant was not liable as an arranger under CERCLA. See id. at 702.
The court sought to show that the outcome of the case would be the same regard-
less of which test it employed. See id. The North Landing court ultimately chose to
adopt the "crucial decision" test, stating that "[iun the absence of Fourth Circuit
precedent, the [clourt will follow precedent from its own district." Id. at 701 (refer-
ring to Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Peck Iron & Metal Co., 814 F. Supp.
1293 (E.D. Va. 1993)); see also text accompanying note 109 (describing the "crucial
decision" test).
124. See Gordon Stafford, 952 F. Supp. at 340.
125. See id. at 338.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id. at 340 ("[T]he Eighth Circuit did not require the United States to
show that the pesticide manufacturers intended for the wastes to be disposed.").
129. See id. ("The Seventh Circuit focused exclusively on the intent of the parties,
concluding that the phrase 'arranged for' implies intentional action.").
130. See id. ("The Eleventh Circuit concluded that it must focus on all of the facts
in a particular case.").
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the case, Powell's actions surrounding the disposal indicated
that he "assisted in activities to conceal the ultimate disposal of
hazardous waste."' 3 ''
The United States District Court of Colorado later followed
the rationale of the Gordon Stafford court when deciding
Mathews v. Dow Chemical Co.' 32 In Mathews, the plaintiff
landowner sought to recover damages for groundwater contami-
nation from neighboring property that previously had been used
to package and store paint thinner, and other hazardous sub-
stances.33 The groundwater contamination allegedly resulted
from spillage of hazardous substances associated with the paint
thinner operation.
34
The district court outlined the "[tihree leading cases" that
"have each taken different approaches in interpreting 'arranged
for. " 35 It went on to hold that the Eleventh Circuit's case-by-
case approach, which considered all relevant factors-including
intent, ownership, and knowledge-was "most faithful to the
statutory language and purposes of CERCLA." 35 The court in
Mathews felt that the Eighth Circuit's strict liability approach
"stretch[ed] the meaning of 'arranged for' too far"37 and that
the Seventh Circuit's specific intent approach was "too limited
and [did] not adequately consider the remedial nature of
CERCLA."38 The district court premised its analysis on the
belief that "no court within the Tenth Circuit" had interpreted
"arranged for" under CERCLA.'39 The Mathews court inexplica-
bly failed to recognize the "specific intent" interpretation previ-
ously adopted within the circuit by the United States District
Court of Utah.140
131. Id. at 341.
132. 947 F. Supp. 1517 (D. Colo. 1996).
133. See id. at 1519.
134. See id.
135. Id. at 1523 (citing South Fla. Water Management Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d
402 (11th Cir. 1996); Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir.
1993); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989)).
136. Id. at 1525.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1523.
140. See Ekotek Site PRP Comm. v. Self, 932 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (D. Utah 1996).
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The Eleventh Circuit's case-by-case approach to CERCLA
arranger liability presents a unique challenge to those who are
potentially liable as arrangers under CERCLA.14' The case-by-
case approach requires consideration of factors such as intent,
ownership of the hazardous substances, and knowledge of the
disposal when determining arranger liability." These factors
are not dispositive, however, and depending on the formula that
a court relies on to evaluate them, disparate outcomes may
emerge from identical facts.' "Although some lines of demar-
cation can be identified, questions remain concerning the mini-
mum connections that a person must have with a transaction
that ultimately results in disposal of hazardous substances be-
fore that person is liable as an arranger."'"
IN SEARCH OF A UNIFIED APPROACH TO ARRANGER LIABILITY
A unified approach to arranger liability is necessary for sever-
al reasons. For potentially responsible parties to adequately
protect themselves, they need to understand their possible liabil-
ity under CERCLA fully."1 Additionally, if parties know in ad-
For a discussion of Ekotek, see supra note 100.
141. See Buboise, supra note 35, at 474 (noting that because the case-by-case ap-
proach has yielded few guidelines, it is unclear how closely connected an individual
must be to a transaction for liability to attach).
142. See South Fla. Water Management Dist. v. Montalvo, 84 F.3d 402, 406-07
(11th Cir. 1996).
143. See id. at 407 ("While factors such as a party's knowledge (or lack thereof) of
the disposal, ownership of the hazardous substances, and intent are relevant to de-
termining whether there has been an 'arrangement' for disposal, they are not neces-
sarily determinative of liability in every case.").
144. Buboise, supra note 35, at 474. Buboise went on to state:
[Clourts seem content to examine each case on its facts, leaving parties
who may have transactions that involve hazardous substances with very
little guidance.
[The lack of uniformity in the courts' analysis makes it difficult
for parties to have any reasonable assurances that their transactions in-
volving hazardous substances will not subject them to potential arranger
liability ....
Id. at 486-87.
145. Many have argued that a uniform scheme of liability always was intended by
Congress. See Lansford-Coaldale Joint Water Auth. v. Tonolli Corp., 4 F.3d '1209,
1225 (3d Cir. 1993) (pointing out "the federal interest in uniformity in the applica-
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vance that they will be strictly liable for any release of hazard-
ous substances, they are more likely to seek newer and safer
methods of hazardous waste disposal.'46
The presence of multiple judicial interpretations of a federal
statute creates additional concerns. The lack of a uniform
CERCLA arranger liability scheme presents the same increased
costs that arise when a given law varies from state to state:
inconsistency costs; information costs; litigation costs; instability
costs; costs associated with externalities; and drafting costs. 4 7
Further, multiple interpretations introduce great uncertainty in
tion of CERCLA"); Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1464 (9th
Cir. 1986) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("[Bloth the policy and legislative history of
CERCLA necessitate the formulation of uniform federal rules of liability under sec-
tion 107." (citing Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Mo.
1985); Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v.
A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249 (S.D. Ill. 1984); United States v. Ward,
[1984] 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1235 (E.D.N.C. 1984); United States v. Chem-Dyne
Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983))). Although CERCLA greatly limits avail-
able indemnification provisions, it nonetheless allows the allocation of responsibility
for remediation of contamination between contracting parties through indemnity or
"hold harmless" agreements. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); 1 MAYS, supra note 31,
§ 7.15, at 7-30.
146. See Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 33, at 1520
(advocating that a strict liability scheme is the most efficient means of encouraging
the development of safer waste disposal techniques).
147. See Allan W. Vestal, 'Assume a Rather Large Boat... ":The Mess We Have
Made of Partnership Law, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 487, 524 n.185 (1997) (describ-
ing the six "benefits or cost-reducing attributes of uniform laws" identified by Profes-
sors Ribstein and Kobayashi). These cost-reducing attributes are:
(1) a reduction in "inconsistency costs" by exposing parties involved in
multiple jurisdictions to fewer sets of governance rules; (2) a reduction in
"information costs" by making it easier for parties involved in multiple
jurisdictions to determine what statute applies and to predict judicial in-
terpretations of applicable statutes; (3) a reduction in "litigation costs"
"by trivializing otherwise difficult choice-of-law issues and eliminating
deadweight litigation costs involved in forum shopping"; (4) a reduction in
"instability costs" as the uniform regime establishes a momentum to re-
sist statutory changes that would differentially affect the parties to exist-
ing contracts; (5) a reduction in "externalities" when state legislators pass
legislation to aid constituents at the expense of nonconstituents, by giving
legislators a common solution to facilitate reciprocal fairness; and (6) a
reduction in "drafting costs" by allowing drafting agencies to hire experts
and otherwise dedicating resources to improve the quality of the legisla-
tive product.
Id. (citing Bruce H. Kabayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, An Economic Analysis of Uni-
form State Laws, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 137-40 (1996)).
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litigation, create questions of legal complexity, promote forum
shopping, and "produce a wholly unjustifiable lack of uniformity
in the practical impact of a major federal statute on both plain-
tiffs and defendants."" 8 It therefore is imperative that Congress
or the courts promulgate a uniform interpretation of CERCLA
arranger liability.
The Statutory Language
The judiciary undeniably has a responsibility to adhere to
CERCLA's statutory language." The legislative proposals that
led to the enactment of the final statute50 contemplated two
different liability schemes.15" ' One of the bills considered by the
House of Representatives, which Congress eventually rejected,
imposed liability on those who "caused or contributed" to hazard-
ous problems.152 The Senate proposal, which ultimately was
148. G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on
Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 341 (1982) (arguing for a universal
interpretation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) provi-
sions of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970); see also Smith Land & Im-
provement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 92 (1988) ("In resolving the successor
liability issues here, the district court must consider national uniformity; otherwise,
CERCLA aims may be evaded easily by a responsible party's choice to arrange a
merger or consolidation under the laws of particular states which unduly restrict
successor liability."); Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1464 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) ("'To in-
sure the development of a uniform rule of law, and to discourage business[es] deal-
ing in hazardous substances from locating primarily in states with more lenient
laws, the bill will encourage the further development of a Federal common law in
[the CERCLA liability] area of law.'" (quoting 126 CONG. REc. 31,965 (1980) (state-
ment of Rep. Florio))).
149. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979)
("As in all cases of statutory construction, [the Court's] task is to interpret the
words of [the statute] in light of the purposes Congress sought to serve."); Abbott v.
Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 938 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that in all cases of statutory
construction, a court begins with the words of the statute and approaches them with
the understanding that its "role is not to set public policy, but, rather, to discern
the legislature's will"), vacated, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
150. See Grad, supra note 18, at 2 (identifying the three bills that contributed to
the final legislation-H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. (1980); H.R. 85, 96th Cong. (1980); and
S. 1480, 96th Cong. (1980)).
151. See John Copeland Nagle, CERCLA, Causation, and Responsibility, 78 MINN.
L. REV. 1493, 1493 (1994).
152. See id. at 1493-94 (referring to H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. § 3071(a)(1)(D) (1980)).
Based on the wording in the bill, the exact liability standard is unclear; the bill
states that "any person who caused or contributed to the release or threatened re-
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adopted in the final version of CERCLA, imposed liability on all
"responsible parties."153 The choice of responsible parties, and
not causation, indicates that Congress intended a strict liability
scheme based on the difficulty in applying traditional tort causa-
tion doctrines to hazardous waste cases."M
CERCLA explicitly provides that the standard of liability
should be construed in accordance with that established under
section 311 of the Clean Water Act,'55 which the courts already
had interpreted as a strict liability standard.5 ' As in the Clean
Water Act, the narrowly written, enumerated defenses outlined
in CERCLA 57 imply strict liability. Courts have concluded that
if the statute were to impose a negligence standard, the enumer-
ated "defense of due care with respect to possible intervention by
lease [of hazardous substances] shall be strictly liable for such [cleanup] costs." H.R.
7020, 96th Cong. § 3071(a)(1)(D) (1980), reprinted in 2 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTO-
RY, supra note 4, at 391, 438. This liability scheme has been described by scholars
both as a causation standard, see Nagle, supra note 151, at 1493-94, and as a strict
liability standard, see Grad, supra note 18, at 5.
153. See Nagle, supra note 151, at 1494 (referring to S. 1480, 96th Cong. § 4(a)
(1980)). "[Tlhose actually 'responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or injury
from chemical poisons [may be tagged with] the cost of their actions . . . .- United
States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1882 (1998) (quoting S. REP. No. 96-848, supra
note 4, at 13, reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 320).
154. See Nagle, supra note 151, at 1503 ("The Senate bill specified in the statute
itself the precise elements of liability instead of simply relying on the common law
understanding of those who 'caused or contributed' to hazardous waste contamina-
tion.").
155. 33 U.S.C. § 1321 (1994). The CERCLA provision states: "'[Lliability' under this
subchapter shall be construed to be the standard of liability which obtains under
section 1321 of title 33." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32) (1994).
156. See Pinkowski, supra note 37, at 202 n.24 (citing multiple cases supporting
strict liability under the Clean Water Act). According to Pinkowski:
CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.CA. § 9607(a), is fairly clear about the nature
of CERCLA liability. Although the statute does not specify that liability
under section 107(a) is strict, it does describe who is liable and clearly
states that liability may be defeated only by the defenses in 107(b). Fur-
ther, CERCLA § 101(32) provides that liability shall be construed to be
the standard of liability under section 311 of the Clean Water Act. Fed-
eral common law has held section 311 to impose strict liability.
Id. at 201-02 (footnotes omitted). Topol and Snow made a similar claim. See 1
TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 10, § 4.2, at 336 ("At the time that Congress [enacted
CERCLA], Section 311 of the Clean Water Act had been construed by the courts as
imposing strict liability upon certain designated parties, subject only to the defenses
specifically enumerated in that statute.").
157. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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third parties would be redundant, because due care is always a
defense to negligence."'58
Strict liability also serves as the most efficient means of en-
couraging development of safer methods of hazardous waste
disposal.'59 In fact, many scholars feel that CERCLA is clear in
its imposition of strict liability. 6 ' As Professor Nagle conclud-
ed, the language of CERCLA "does not require proof that a
defendant's actions caused the contamination." 6' The statute
may appear -harsh""6 2 or may lead to the "unfair imposition of
liability,"163 but the courts must take the statute as writ-
ten."M
158. Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 33, at 1518; cf
2A SINGER, supra note 21, § 45.12, at 61 ("[U]nreasonableness of the result produced
by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is reason for rejecting
that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result. It is
a 'well established principle of statutory interpretation that the law favors rational
and sensible construction.'" (quoting American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63,
71 (1982))).
159. See Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 33, at 1519-
20 ("By forcing corporations involved in toxic waste disposal to internalize cleanup
costs, strict liability serves as the most efficient means of encouraging the develop-
ment of safer waste disposal techniques."); see also B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski, 99
F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that strict liability is intended to insure that
those who benefit commercially "internalize the environmental costs of the activity as
a cost of doing business"), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2318 (1998).
160. See, e.g., 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 10, § 1.2, at 10. According to Topol &
Snow:
Section 107(a) of the statute imposes strict liability upon [potentially re-
sponsible parties (PRPs)]. A plaintiff need not prove that a PRP negli-
gently caused an adverse condition at a hazardous waste site. Instead,
liability for governmental cleanup costs may be imposed on a PRP if the
following conditions are satisfied: (1) the site where cleanup occurred was
a "facility" as defined by CERCLA (2) a "release" or "a threatened re-
lease" of a "hazardous substance" occurred at the site; and (3) the release
or threatened release caused the plaintiff to incur response costs.
Id.; see also Nagle, supra note 151, at 1507 ("[The statute itself specifies who is lia-
ble, and the statutory language says nothing about showing cause in fact."); supra
note 156 and accompanying text (discussing the imposition of strict liability under
the statute through CERCLA's reference to the Clean Water Act).
161. Nagle, supra note 151, at 1524 (agreeing that CERCLA should be interpreted
to impose strict arranger liability, as held in United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993), and United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964
F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992).
162. Alcan, 990 F.2d at 721.
163. Alcan, 964 F.2d at 267.
164. See Alcan, 990 F.2d at 717; cf Nagle, supra note 151, at 1524-43 (recommend-
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Recognizing Legislative Intent
CERCLA's legislative history lacks the committee and confer-
ence reports that traditionally accompany statutes.'65 Suffi-
cient materials are available, however, to discern Congress's
intent in enacting CERCLA.'66 Courts frequently have looked
to the existing legislative history to interpret provisions of
CERCLA.'67 The available legislative history supports the con-
clusion that responsibility, and not causation, was the legitimate
intent of Congress.6 8 As one scholar noted, "CERCLA's liabili-
ty provision, which seeks to establish the responsibility of per-
sons to pay the cost to remedy the harmful effects of their inade-
quate disposal activities, was critical to Congress'[s] choice to
implement the new, strict standard of care."'6 9
ing a "no causation, no responsibility" liability scheme premised on the notion that
"[ijf a party can prove that it did not pollute a site, it should not have to pay").
165. See supra note 22; see also Nagle, supra note 16, at 1406 (commenting on the
dearth of useful legislative history regarding CERCLA).
166. Mikva points out that the tools necessary to ascertain legislative intent go
beyond committee and conference reports:
Even the nuts and bolts of the legislative process can be valuable in di-
vining the intent of Congress. The use of committee reports and floor
debate (and the lack of it), the difference between floor amendments and
committee amendments, the trade-offs between statutory language and
committee report language, the impact of conference committee changes
in a bill, the effect of conflicting interpretations given by members during
floor debate-all of these elements are weighed differently by judges who
have been exposed to the tortuous way in which a bill becomes law.
Mikva, supra note 16, at 634; see also 2A SINGER, supra note 21, § 45.06, at 30
("[Tihe sources of legislative intent are the language of a statute, the policy behind
the statute and concepts of reasonableness and legislative history.").
167. See, e.g., United States v. Bestfoods, 118 S. Ct. 1876, 1883 (1998) (analyzing
corporate liability); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 365-69, 373-74 (1986) (ana-
lyzing compensable damages); OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116
F.3d 1574, 1581-82 (5th Cir. 1997) (analyzing contribution); Pinal Creek Group v.
Newmont Mining Corp.,- 118 F.3d 1298, 1301 (9th Cir. 1997) (analyzing contribution),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998); United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506,
1513-14 (11th Cir. 1997) (analyzing retroactive liability); B.F. Goodrich v. Betkoski,
99 F.3d 505, 514 (2d Cir. 1996) (analyzing the purpose and liability scheme of the
statute), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2318 (1998); Alcan, 964 F.2d at 264-65 (analyzing
causation).
168. See Grad, supra note 18, at 21.
169. Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under
CERCLA. A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 65, 78 (1992).
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Both the House and the Senate considered bills imposing
strict liability when devising hazardous waste legislation. 7 '
Although the final bill deleted the term "strict liability," opting
instead to refer to the liability scheme in the Clean Water Act,
the statute nonetheless implicitly maintained a strict liability
standard. 7'
Senator Randolph, Chairman of the Committee on Environ-
ment and Public Works and manager of the compromise bill that
ultimately became CERCLA, specifically pointed out that the
statute still imposed strict liability despite the change in statu-
tory wording.'72 In presenting the final bill to the Senate, Sen-
170. See Grad, supra note 18, at 9 (discussing strict liability as laid forth in S.
1480, 96th Cong. (1980)); id. at 3 (discussing strict liability as envisioned in H.R. 85,
96th Cong. (1980)); id. at 14-15 (discussing the concern in the House of Representa-
tives regarding the scope of CERCLA liability in H.R. 7020, 96th Cong. (1980)); id.
at 16-17 (discussing the concern over the third party defense to strict liability in
"the Gore amendments").
Senate Report 96-848 summed up the rationale for CERCLA strict liability in
describing the imposition of such a liability scheme in Senate Bill 1480:
The goal of assuring that those who caused chemical harm bear the
costs of that harm is addressed in the reported legislation by the imposi-
tion of liability. Strict liability, the foundation of S. 1480, assures that
those who benefit financially from a commercial activity internalize the
health and environmental costs of that activity into the costs of doing
business. Strict liability is an important instrument in allocating the
risks imposed upon society by the manufacture, transport, use, and dis-
posal of inherently hazardous substances.
To establish provisions of liability any less than strict, joint, and
several liability would be to condone a system in which innocent victims
bear the actual burden of releases, while those who conduct commerce in
hazardous substances which cause such damage benefit with relative im-
punity.
S. REP. No. 96-848, supra note 4, at 13, reprinted in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HIsTO-
RY, supra note 4, at 320.
171. See Grad, supra note 18, at 21-22 (describing Senator Randolph's comments
that the CERCLA compromise bill contained a strict liability scheme (citing 126
CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen. Randolph))).
172. See id. at 21 ("[Senator Randolph] noted that strict liability was kept in the
compromise by specifying the standard of liability under section 311 of the [Clean
Water Act] .... " (citing 126 CONG. REC. 30,932 (1980) (statement of Sen.
Randolph))).
Although statements of individual legislators often are accorded little weight by
courts, see 2A SINGER, supra note 21, § 48.13, at 353, a court will consider state-
ments by the committee person in charge of a bill in construing provisions of the
bill subsequently enacted into law, see id. § 48.14, at 361 ("These statements are
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ator Stafford, a sponsor of the compromise bill, clarified the
inclusion of strict liability in the final version of the act. 3
Congressman Florio similarly articulated Congress's intent to
impose strict liability when the final bill was presented to the
House of Representatives. ' 4 Moreover, those outside of Con-
gress were aware that CERCLA included a strict liability
scheme. For instance, in a letter to Congressman Florio com-
menting on CERCLA's liability provisions, the Department of
Justice clearly acknowledged that CERCLA's liability scheme
was strict."
Congress reiterated its intent regarding CERCLA liability in a
more straightforward manner when considering amendments to
the statute in 1985."76 As stated by the House Committee on
regarded as being like supplemental committee reports and are accorded the same
weight as formal committee reports.").
173. See Grad, supra note 18, at 28 ("Senator Stafford, in response to questions
from Senator Simpson, reasserted that the liability standard under the Randolph-
Stafford compromise was still strict liability by reference to section 311 of the [Clean
Water Act]." (citing 126 CONG. REC. 30,986 (1980) (statement of Sen. Stafford))).
Like the committee person in charge of a particular bill, the bill's sponsor is
particularly well informed regarding the bill's purpose, meaning, and intended effect.
See 2A SINGER, supra note 21, § 48.15, at 364 ("[C]ourts give consideration to state-
ments made by a bill's sponsor on the same grounds supporting the use of state-
ments by the committeeman in charge of the bill." (footnote omitted)).
174. See Grad, supra note 18, at 30 ("While strict liability was not mentioned,
Congressman Florio assured the members [of the House] that it was indeed contin-
ued by way of reference to section 311 of the [Clean Water Act]." (citing 126 CONG.
REc. 31,965 (1980) (statement of Rep. Florio))).
175. The letter stated, in pertinent part:
Senator Randolph is correct in stating that the liability standard under
section 311 [of the Clean Water Act] is one of strict liability. Both the
Senate passed "Superfund" legislation and section 311 provide for liability
subject to certain specifically enumerated defenses. Neither provision al-
lows for a defense based on the defendant's non-negligent conduct or ex-
ercise of due care. Caselaw construing section 311 clearly indicates that
not only are the defenses to be narrowly construed but the plain mean-
ing of the liability regime establishes a strict liability standard.
Letter from Alan A. Parker, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs,
to James J. Florio, Chairman, Subcomm. on Transportation and Commerce of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce (Dec. 1, 1980), reprinted in 126
CONG. REC. 31,966 (1980).
176. See HOUSE COMIM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, SUPERFUND AMENDMENTS OF
1986, H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 1, at 74 (1985) [hereinafter H.R. REP. NO. 99-
253(1)], reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2856, and in 3 SARA LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY, supra note 10, at 1764, 1837.
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Energy and Commerce, "[n]o change has been made in the stan-
dard of liability that applies under CERCLA. As under section
311 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. [§]
1321, liability under CERCLA is strict, that is, without regard to
fault or willfulness."' The report of the House Committee on
the Judiciary and the Senate debates that followed the presenta-
tion of the conference report similarly reinforced a strict liability
scheme under CERCLA.
178
The available legislative history regarding CERCLA demon-
strates that Congress envisioned a strict liability standard, and
there is nothing in the wording of the statute that is contrary to
this vision.179 Under CERCLA's strict liability scheme, parties
are accountable for waste disposal practices regardless of intent,
negligence, or causal connection."' Further, strict liability
makes sense in the context of hazardous operations'' and,
more specifically, in the context of hazardous waste disposal,
based on the inherent danger involved in those activities.8 2
Simply put, "[t]he text, structure, and history of the statute
177. Id.
178. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-253(111), supra note 10, at 15, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3038, and in 3 SARA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 2227
("Liability for the cost of clean-ups under CERCLA... may be imposed without
fault . . . ."); 132 CONG. REC. 28,447 (1986), reprinted in 6 SARA LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY, supra note 10, at 5236. Senator Durenberger, during Senate debate following
presentation of the House Conference Report on SARA, stated: "But on the question
of liability we have held firm. The rule is still strict, joint, and several liability.
.. . Senator Stafford's steadfast adherence to this principle has been the one thing
that everyone could count on from the very day this reauthorization process was be-
gun." Id.
179. See 1 MAYS, supra note 31, § 7.01, at 7-3 (pointing out that although
CERCLA's standard of liability is not specifically mentioned in the statute,
CERCLA's legislative history makes it clear that the standard is one of strict liabili-
ty); Oswald, supra note 1, at 590 ("The legislative history does indicate, however,
that Congress intended that the general standard of liability under CERCLA be
strict liability.").
180. Factors such as intent, negligence, and causation simply are irrelevant under a
strict liability standard. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 75, at 537 ("The defen-
dant is held liable merely because, as a matter of social adjustment, the conclusion
is that the responsibility should be so placed.").
181. See Oswald, supra note 1, at 590-98 (describing .the policy rationales underly-
ing the imposition of strict liability to hazardous operations).
182. See id. at 598-603 (describing why strict liability is appropriate under
CERCLA).
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indicate that CERCLA does not require proof of causation. Most
importantly, the statute itself specifies who is liable, and the
statutory language says nothing about showing cause in
fact."
18
The Evolution of Arranger Liability
For at least a decade after the statute was enacted, courts
accepted a strict liability scheme under CERCLA without contro-
versy.' As of 1992, scholars examining existing case law stat-
ed that "[it is now well settled that responsible parties are
strictly liable under CERCLA"' and that courts "have unani-
mously concluded that the appropriate standard under CERCLA
is strict liability."
86
Congress did anticipate, however, the adoption of federal com-
mon law to supplement the statute:""
In sum, Congress intended that courts would play a substan-
tial role in clarifying and supplementing the rules of liability
stated in the Act. Congress expected that courts would focus
on the purposes of the statute, i.e., prompt cleanups, a strict
standard of care for disposal activities, narrowly limited
183. Nagle, supra note 151, at 1507.
184. See 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 10, § 4.2, at 337-42; see also Oswald, supra
note 1, at 598 (stating that "courts uniformly agree that strict liability applies to
CERCLA violations"); Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note
33, at 1518 (noting that "[clourts addressing the issue have concluded, however, that
CERCLA does impose strict liability"); cf General Electric Co. v. AAMCO Transmis-
sions, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Almost all of the courts that have
held defendants liable as arrangers have found that the defendant had some actual
involvement in the decision to dispose of waste." (emphasis added)). See generally
Healy, supra note 169, at 104-27 (examining the application of CERCLA strict liabil-
ity in various contexts).
185. Healy, supra note 169, at 72.
186. 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 10, § 4.2, at 337 (emphasis added).
187. See Healy, supra note 169, at 102 ("Congress also anticipated that the courts
would play a critical role in implementing this new standard of liability."). The
courts fulfilled this role by subsequently clarifying CERCLA's liability scheme. See,
e.g., Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86, 90-92 (3d Cir.
1988) (adopting successor liability); United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp.
802, 809-10 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (adopting joint and several liability). Congress thereaf-
ter commented favorably on such judicial actions. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-253(I), supra
note 176, at 74, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.CA.N. at 2856, and in 3 SARA LEGISLA-
TIVE HISTORY, supra note 10, at 1837.
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defenses, and an equitable cleanup cost allocation, to guide
their construction of interstitial rules.
1
'
The evolution of federal common law therefore was never meant
to supplant Congress's intended strict liability scheme.'89
Courts have reasoned that a strict liability standard is the best
way to meet the congressional goals of "rapid cleanup, cost-shift-
ing to responsible parties, and cost-spreading throughout the
industry and the population of consumers.""9 Although strict
liability is admittedly harsh,'9 ' if parties know they are legally
responsible, they should be able to protect themselves accord-
ingly.1
92
Since 1992, however, courts have strayed, without apparent
justification, from the original legislative intent of strict liabili-
ty.l'9 This deviation from the CERCLA liability scheme that
had been judicially accepted at the federal appellate level for
over a decade can be classified only as judicial activism."
188. Healy, supra note 169, at 104 (emphasis added).
189. See supra notes 168-79 and accompanying text.
190. Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 33, at 1519 (cit-
ing United States v. Conservation Chem. Co., [1984] 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 20,207, 20,208 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 3, 1984); United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp.
1103, 1104 (D.N.J. 1983)).
191. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711, 721 (2d Cir. 1993).
Although this liability scheme is potentially harsh, it is justified for sev-
eral reasons. First, it shifts cleanup costs from the victims of hazardous
waste to the parties responsible for creating the hazard. Second, it cre-
ates incentives for safer handling and disposal of wastes by ensuring that
cleanup costs are internalized by the waste-generating industry. Third, it
relieves the strain on the government's limited budget by encouraging
defendants to locate and implead other responsible parties with whom
they may share the burden of cleanup.
Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, supra note 33, at 1513. Addi-
tionally, this "harshness" may be attenuated in individual cases through indemnifica-
tion or contribution proceedings. See JOEL S. MOSKOWrrZ, ENVIRONMiENTAL LIABILrY
AND REAL PROPERTY TRANSAcTIONS: LAW AND PRACTIcE § 12.6, at 156-65 (2d ed.
1995); supra note 145.
192. This argument loses some strength in light of the retroactive enforcement pro-
vision of CERCLA. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810
F.2d 726, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1986) ("Although CERCLA does not expressly provide for
retroactivity, it is manifestly clear that Congress intended CERCLA to have retroac-
tive effect."); MOSKOWITZ, supra note 191, § 4.5, at 48-49 (explaining that courts
have held "that retroactive application of CERCLA for acts committed before the
enactment of CERCLA is intended by the statute and does not offend due process").
193. See 1 TOPOL & SNOW, supra note 10, at Ill (Supp. 1998).
194. See id. As Topol and Snow point out:
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Judge Posner's 1993 decision in Amcast'95 represented the
court's initial departure from the paradigmatic approach of strict
CERCLA arranger liability, although previous court decisions
may have set the stage for the retreat.9 ' Posner's requirement
of intentional action 97  seemingly ignored the numerous
CERCLA strict liability decisions that the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana found persuasive;98
in so doing, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's
finding that the supplier of a hazardous substance arranged for
its disposal.' 99
Although ample CERCLA case law imposing strict arranger
liability existed at the time Amcast was decided, Posner opted to
rely instead on a single case for support of his analysis of ar-
ranger liability:.. Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad v. American
Although... Congress has managed to agree on changes to only one
small aspect of the scheme (the reduced exposure to liability of lenders
and fiduciaries), the federal courts have undertaken a Superfund reform
of their own. While they have reached only a few truly radical decisions,
the federal courts have frequently decided close cases in ways that con-
stitute departures from past rulings. In addition, the federal courts have,
in a number of significant instances, read the law somewhat more favor-
ably for potentially responsible parties. We can only assume that some
courts now recognize that the Superfund program has gone too far and
that a fix is needed. Those courts seem ready and willing, within the
limits of their judicial role, to correct the problems.
Id.
195. Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993).
196. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., [1988] 27 Env't
Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1558 (S.D. Fla. 1988), affd, 893 F.2d 1313 (11th Cir. 1990); Ed-
ward Hines Lumber Co. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 685 F. Supp. 651, 654-57 (N.D.
Ill.), affd on other grounds, 861 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1988); United States v. Westing-
house Elec. Corp., [19831 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1230 (S.D. Ind. 1983). These cas-
es differ from Amcast, however, in that they deal with the "useful" substance excep-
tion to CERCLA liability. See Florida Power, [19881 27 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at
1560; Edward Hines, 685 F. Supp. at 656; Westinghouse, [1983] 22 Env't Rep. Cas.
(BNA) at 1232. See also supra note 73 and accompanying text (discussing the "use-
ful" substance exception).
197. See Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751.
198. See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 779 F. Supp. 1519, 1535 (N.D. Ind.
1991) (citing Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146,
1150 (1st Cir. 1989)); Rodenbeck v. Marathon Petroleum Co., 742 F. Supp. 1448,
1455-56 (N.D. Ind. 1990); General Electric. Co. v. Litton Bus. Sys. Inc., 715 F. Supp.
949, 959 (W.D. Mo. 1989), affd, 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990)), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993).
199. See Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751.
200. See id. Posner also failed to explore the decision in Edward Hines, a previous
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Cyanamid Co.,"' an opinion he wrote three years earlier. Indi-
ana Harbor was a non-CERCLA case involving a common law
decision that explored whether to apply strict liability to a com-
pany that supplied acrylonitrile, a "hazardous" chemical, for rail
transportation.0 2 Crucial to the decision in Indiana Harbor
seemed to be.the extent of danger involved in the "hazardous"
operation; Posner suggested that transportation of a more haz-
ardous substance might warrant the imposition of strict liabil-
ity.20 ' Therein lies the key distinction between Indiana Harbor
and Amcast. In Indiana Harbor, the court found that it had to
look to the common law to determine where the line should be
drawn between negligence and strict liability.24 In Amcast,
however, the court's task was to apply a statute that required
the imposition of strict liability.25 Although Posner made the
correct determination regarding the appropriate liability stan-
dard in Indiana Harbor, such a determination was inappropriate
in Amcast. In Amcast, Posner had a duty to apply the legisla-
tively mandated strict liability standard that Congress enacted
when it created CERCLA.
There is little indication that Judge Posner viewed his role in
Amcast as one involving statutory interpretation. It can be ar-
gued, however, that Posner felt that no interpretation was re-
quired; he may have believed that the plain and ordinary mean-
ing of "arranged for" was apparent from the statutory language.
Seventh Circuit case that involved the "useful" substance exception to strict liability
and that arguably could have supported his requirement of intent. See Edward
Hines, 685 F. Supp. at 656. This is especially surprising in light of the fact that
Posner sat on the panel that affirmed the case. See Edward Hines, 861 F.2d 155,
155 (7th Cir. 1988).
201. 916 F.2d 1174 (7th Cir. 1990).
202. See id. at 1175-76.
203. See id. at 1182 ("We need not speculate on the possibility of imposing strict
liability on shippers of more hazardous materials, such as . . . bombs .... We not-
ed earlier that acrylonitrile is far from being the most hazardous among materials
shipped by rail in highest volume. Or among materials shipped, period.").
204. See id. at 1182-83 (pointing out that "the emphasis is on picking a liability
regime (negligence or strict liability) that will control the particular class of acci-
dents in question most effectively").
205. See supra notes 149-64 and accompanying text. It has been argued that "[bly
resorting to the common law, Judge Posner renderled CERCLA ineffective in achiev-
ing its goals of facilitating cleanup and providing incentives to [potentially responsi-
ble parties]." Caretti, supra note 82, at 244.
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As Posner himself stated, "[alithough the statute defines dispos-
al to include spilling, the critical words... are 'arranged for.'
The words imply intentional action."°6 Perhaps Posner found
the plain meaning that somehow had eluded other courts during
the first twelve years of CERCLA's existence.
207
In announcing his "definition" of "arranged for," however,
Posner cited no source, and apparently ignored other courts'
previous interpretations of the phrase.2 08 Additionally, in rely-
ing only on the language of the statute, Posner contradicted his
own view of the "plain meaning" rule of statutory interpretation.
Posner believes that in interpreting statutes, judges
start with the case law and may never return to the statuto-
ry language .... Even in dealing with statutes that have not
generated a huge body of case law, a judge usually begins not
with the language of the statute but with some conception of
its subject matter and the likely purpose .... 2 "
Judge Posner's failure to mention CERCLA's legislative histo-
ry, even though it was pointed out in Amcast's lower court opin-
ion, 210 is particularly surprising in light of his well-documented
views regarding the importance of understanding the legislative
process and discerning legislative intent when interpreting stat-
206. Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 2 F.3d 746, 751 (7th Cir. 1993) (empha-
sis added).
207. See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
208. See Amcast, 2 F.3d at 751; see also supra note 200 (discussing a previous
district court decision within the Seventh Circuit that had interpreted CERCLA
arranger liability).
209. Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the
Courtroom, 50 U. CM. L. REV. 800, 808 (1983). Posner went on to say.
Of course the words of a statute are always relevant, often decisive, and
usually the most important evidence of what the statute was meant to
accomplish. I merely object to the proposition that one must always begin
with the words, and I am reasonably confident that more often than not
the judge-the good judge as well as the bad judge-in fact begins some-
where else.
Id.
210. See Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex Corp., 779 F. Supp. 1519, 1535 (N.D. Ind.
1991) (summarizing the plaintiffs argument that anything other than strict liability
would make the third party defense of section 9607(b)(3) of CERCLA "superfluous"
(citing 126 CONG. REC. 24,151 (1980); S. REP. No. 96-848, supra note 4, at 13, re-
printed in 1 CERCLA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 4, at 320)), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993).
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utes.21 As a starting point, Posner believes that judges cannot
decide statutory construction cases adequately without under-
standing the legislative process.212 To this end, Posner favors
the establishment of law school courses focusing on the academic
study of legislation,213 with instruction in researching legisla-
tive history as one of its main objectives.214 Further, Posner
has stated that when reviewing statutes, "[clourts [should] look
to the language of the statute, to the legislative history, and to
other evidence of legislative intent.""5 In his view, "[a] court
should adhere to the enacting legislature's purposes (so far as
those purposes can be discerned) even if it is certain that the
211. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 267-70
(1985) [hereinafter POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS]; RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS
OF JURISPRUDENCE 269-78 (1990) [hereinafter POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE]; Richard A.
Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U.
CHI. L. REv. 263, 272, 274-75 (1982) [hereinafter Posner, Reading of Statutes];
Posner, supra note 209, at 804-05, 810, 818.
212. See Mikva, supra note 16, at 632 (discussing Posner's view).
213. See Posner, supra note 209, at 800-05. Posner pointed out that "[w]hile many
academic lawyers are experts on particular statutes-which largely means experts on
what courts have said about the particular statutes they teach-few are experts on
legislation. Few study legislation as an object of systematic inquiry comparable to
the common law . . . ." Id. at 801.
214. See id. at 803-05 (stating that such a course should include topics dealing
with the process of legislation, the empirical study of legislation, techniques for judi-
cial interpretation of statutes, and researching legislative history). Regarding re-
searching legislative history, Posner indicated that "[a] year and a half of reading
briefs in cases that often involve statutory interpretation has convinced me that
many lawyers do not research legislative history as carefully as they research case
law." Id. at 804.
215. Posner, Reading of Statutes, supra note 211, at 272 (footnote omitted); see also
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 317 (1996)
("[I]t would be questionable if judges decided to stop consulting legislative history so
that they could decide issues of statutory interpretation in less time."). Additionally,
other Seventh Circuit opinions written by Posner near the time at which Amcast
was decided expressed his reliance on legislative history and legislative intent when
interpreting statutes. See, e.g., Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d
1176, 1181 (7th Cir. 1993) (relying on legislative history in holding that supplemen-
tal jurisdiction could be exercised over a privacy claim that arose under the Labor
Management Relations Act); Reich v. Great Lakes Indian Fish & Wildlife Comm'n, 4
F.3d 490, 493-94 (7th Cir. 1993) (attempting to determine the legislative intent of a
provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act, and pointing out that in a previous Su-
preme Court case requiring interpretation of the Act, "the Court did not stop with
the 'plain language' of the Act, but went on to examine the legislative intent" (citing
Citicorp Indust. Credit, Inc. v. Brock, 483 U.S. 27, 36 (1987))).
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current legislature has different purposes and will respond by
amending the relevant legislation to reverse the court's interpre-
tation."216
Posner has recognized, however, the long-standing debate
concerning whether it is ever proper, based on the potential bias
of legislators, for judges to use legislative history in interpreting
statutes.217 His solution to this dilemma is an alternative ap-
proach to statutory interpretation: the method of "imaginative
reconstruction."218 Under this approach, the goal of the judge is
"to put himself [or herself] in the shoes of the enacting legisla-
tors and figure out how they would have wanted the statute
applied to the case before him [or her] .,219 This necessarily dic-
tates that the judge cannot study only the plain meaning of a
statute; he or she also must attempt to discern the intent of the
legislature.
The judge who follows this approach will be looking at the
usual things that the intelligent literature on statutory con-
struction tells him to look at-such as the language and
apparent purpose of the statute, its background and struc-
ture, its legislative history (especially the committee reports
and the floor statements of the sponsors), and the bearing of
related statutes.... It is not the judge's job to keep a statute
up to date in the sense of making it reflect contemporary
values; it is his [or her] job to imagine as best he [or she] can
how the legislators who enacted the statute would have
wanted it applied to situations that they did not foresee. 21
216. Posner, supra note 209, at 810.
217. See POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 211, at 269.
218. See id. at 286-93; POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 211, at 273-76; Posner,
supra note 209, at 817-18.
219. POSNER, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 211, at 286-87. Posner went on to point
out that a "judge who follows the suggested approach will not only consider the lan-
guage, structure, and history of the statute, but also study the values and attitudes,
as far as they can be known today, of the period when the legislation was enacted."
Id. at 287 (emphasis added).
220. See POSNER, JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 211, at 273 ("[Judges] cannot only
study plain meanings; they must try to understand the problem that the legislators
faced.").
221. Posner, supra note 209, at 818 (emphasis added); see also POSNER, FEDERAL
COURTS, supra note 211, at 287 (making the same argument).
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Judge Posner inexplicably declined to apply "imaginative recon-
struction" when deciding Amcast.
As a consequence of Posner's decision in Amcast, judicial ap-
plication of strict liability to "arrangers" in CERCLA cases
ceased to be automatic.222 The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Unit-
ed States v. Aceto Agricultural Chemicals Corp.," a decision
that was consistent with the overwhelming majority of previous
cases supporting strict CERCLA arranger liability, later was
viewed by courts as an "alternative approach" to Amcast, expos-
ing a fertile middle ground to the judiciary. This "compromise"
interpretation was seized upon by, among others, the Eleventh
Circuit in South Florida Water Management District v.
Montalvo.Y Once other courts recognized the split among the
federal circuits, a green light was given for judicial activism,
resulting in an ignorance of the original legislative intent and a
myriad of interpretations of CERCLA arranger liability.2"
222. See supra notes 101-44 and accompanying text; see also Caretti, supra note 82,
at 245 ("IT]he Amcast decision presents a potential for other courts to adopt its
faulty reasoning and narrow the scope of CERCLA liability.").
223. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
224. 84 F.3d 402, 409 (11th Cir. 1996). Several federal district courts subsequently
adopted this approach. See, e.g., Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs.,
Inc., 990 F. Supp. 1473, 1479 (M.D. Ga. 1998); United States v. Gordon Stafford,
Inc., 952 F. Supp. 337, 339-40 (N.D. W. Va. 1997); Mathews v. Dow Chem. Co., 947
F. Supp. 1517, 1523-25 (D. Colo. 1996).
225. See supra notes 101-44 and accompanying text. Challenging logic, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals seemingly attempted to reconcile the three approaches to
arranger liability when it decided United States v. Cello-Foil Products, Inc., 100 F.3d
1227 (6th Cir. 1996). The court initially recognized CERCLA's strict liability stan-
dard. See id. at 1231 ("[Ihf the tortured history of CERCLA has taught us one les-
son, it is that CERCLA is a strict liability statute."). It then went on to state that
"tn]otwithstanding the strict liability nature of CERCLA, it would be error for us not
to recognize the indispensable role that state of mind must play in determining
whether a party has 'otherwise arranged for disposal .. .of hazardous substances.'"
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994)). According to the court, "in the absence of a
contract or agreement, a court must look to the totality of the circumstances, includ-
ing any 'affirmative acts to dispose,' to determine whether the Defendants intended
to enter into an arrangement for disposal." Id. at 1232 (emphasis added). The court
justified its holding by noting that "this principle is in line with the Seventh
Circuit's 'intentional action' requirement for arranger liability announced in Amcast."
Id. This line of reasoning arguably would be of little use to those facing potential
liability as "arrangers" under CERCLA.
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CONCLUSION
The statutory language and available legislative history indi-
cate that Congress intended CERCLA to possess a concomitant
strict liability standard. Courts applied such a standard consis-
tently for over a decade in CERCLA arranger liability cases.
Judge Posner's 1993 opinion in Amcast represented a sharp de-
parture from previous CERCLA case law by inexplicably requir-
ing intentional action for liability to attach. Despite the wealth
of previous case law and the existing legislative history, Posner
chose instead to adopt a "plain meaning" of "arranged for" that
previous courts overwhelmingly had rejected. Other courts sub-
sequently viewed Posner's opinion as an alternate interpretation
to the strict liability approach adopted in the plethora of previ-
ous CERCLA arranger liability cases, paving the way for a third,
middle-ground interpretation of "arranged for" that has left the
interpretation of CERCLA "arranger liability" in an uncertain
state.
The United States Supreme Court routinely decides issues on
which federal appellate courts disagree. The existence of three
separate interpretations of CERCLA arranger liability makes
the issue ripe for the Supreme Court to determine "the law of
the land."2 6 A unified judicial interpretation is necessary to as-
sist those affected by CERCLA in taking prophylactic measures
to ensure compliance with the statute. In light of the wording of
the statute and the available legislative history, courts should
interpret CERCLA as Congress intended, imposing strict liability
on parties responsible for arranging the disposal of hazardous
substances.
David W. Lannetti
226. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatical-
ly the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
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